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This paper addresses the conceptual issues around the negative price effects of 
technological change on agricultural producers, explores price policy options vis-￿-vis 
this problem, and reviews and compares experiences across Asian countries as they 
transformed their rural economies.  It then draws implications for the challenge of 
achieving a smallholder-led agricultural revolution in Africa in the context of market 
liberalization.   ii 
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TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND PRICE EFFECTS IN AGRICULTURE:   
CONCEPTUAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
 
Eleni Gabre-Madhin
1, Christopher B. Barrett
2, and Paul Dorosh
3 
 
I.    SETTING THE STAGE 
 
The importance of technological advance to economic growth has become 
accepted fact.  Yet the answers to questions of who adopts new technologies, how 
quickly, and at what cost to society remain elusive.  While these issues are not unique 
throughout history, the advent of biological and chemical technologies that are both 
divisible and scale-neutral and the experiences referred to as the ￿Green Revolution￿ in 
the latter-half of the twentieth century throughout much of Asia have fostered a lively and 
long debate on the growth and particularly the distributional consequences of 
technological change in the agriculture of developing countries.   
The distributional consequences of technological change on technology adopters 
resulting from changes in relative output prices are an important dimension of this 
evolving debate.  As output expands through technological change, in the face of 
relatively inelastic demand, the significant drop in output prices that results not only 
adversely affects the incomes of technology adopters but also threatens the very process 
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of a sustained technological advance itself.   The key issue is that, although technological 
change may reduce unit costs, prices may fall faster. In recognition of these adverse price 
and income effects, different schools of thought have emerged.  Among these are those 
who advocate letting market forces bring domestic prices in line with border prices 
(Schultz, 1978); those who favor using price policy as a means of income redistribution 
(Taylor, 1980; Streeten, 1987); and those who emphasize the need for price intervention 
in the short term while aligning to long-term international parity (Timmer, 1986).   
These debates are far from over.  In sub-Saharan Africa, where technological 
advance of the scale and scope of the Green Revolution in Asia has yet to occur, the 
questions of who adopts, how quickly, and at what social cost, are critical.  In contrast to 
Asia, Africa is facing these questions in a context of market liberalization, implying that 
the issue of the negative price effects of technological change on producers is particularly 
relevant to African countries as they attempt to increase agricultural productivity and to 
foster a smallholder-led agricultural revolution.   It should be recognized, however, that 
African countries are, in the short-term, net food importers on average.  In the post-
market reform era, evidence in numerous cases across the continent points to the 
increased volatility of African markets and the difficulty of ensuring remunerative prices 
for producers in bumper crop years.
4   
Market liberalization implies a greater reliance on market mechanisms to ensure 
the efficient distribution of agricultural output.   Thus, the extent of market integration 
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determines the demand for agricultural output. With market liberalization, the potentially 
adverse price effects of technological change must be borne by the market, a different 
model than that which prevailed in Asia during its Green Revolution.  The more 
segmented the market, the less responsive demand is to changes in price and the lower 
the producers￿ share of the gains from increased production.  Even if markets were to 
function perfectly, the expectation that an agricultural transformation can occur without 
government intervention at some level in markets is contrary to the history of economic 
transformation in either the industrialized countries of Europe and North America or 
more recently in Asia.   
To begin, such an expectation would require that markets work.  In sub-Saharan 
Africa, a major lesson learned from two decades of market reforms is that, while 
removing policy distortions in order to  ￿get prices right￿ is necessary, it is not sufficient 
for ￿getting markets right.￿  That is, in order to ensure that markets work effectively, 
appropriate investments in institutions and infrastructure are required.  Thus, the evidence 
suggests that the free market approach of the complete withdrawal of the public sector 
has had deleterious consequences for advancing Africa￿s agricultural transformation 
(Kherallah et al., 2002; Barrett and Carter 1999).     
This paper addresses the conceptual issues around this fundamental problem of 
the negative price effects of technological change on agricultural producers, explores 
price policy options vis-￿-vis this problem, and reviews and compares experiences across 
Asian countries as they transformed their rural economies.  It then draws implications for   4
the challenge of achieving a smallholder-led agricultural revolution in Africa in the 
context of market liberalization.   
 
II.  THE PROBLEM OF PRICE VARIABILITY 
 
  Neoclassical economic theory leads us to believe that price will always tend 
toward the point of intersection between the Marshallian upward-sloping supply and 
downward-sloping demand curves.  As excess demand below the intersection drives the 
price up and excess supply above the intersection pushes the price down, the ￿invisible 
hand￿ is presumed to guide and stabilize the economy.  In order for this to happen, theory 
requires that the economy be comprised of many small units of buyers and sellers, each 
commodity and factor have close substitutes, and products and factors be perfectly 
mobile.  In reality, of course, a self-adjusting agriculture does not exist and agricultural 
prices, across countries and across time, exhibit wide and irregular fluctuations.  Price 
variability is revealed in wide inter-annual swings in price levels as well as intra-annual 
volatility. 
 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRICE VARIABILITY 
 
  Why do agricultural prices exhibit such wide and irregular fluctuations, 
especially in low-income countries?  estimates of aggregate demand for food reveal that 
demand is highly inelastic, meaning that a large percentage change in price is associated 
with a small change in quantity demanded.  The severe price inelasticity of demand for   5
agricultural products is one of the principal factors underlying food price variability.  The 
effect of price inelastic demand is compounded at the producer level by the wedge 
between retail and producer prices.  Thus, with an elasticity of ￿0.2, retail prices must fall 
by 10 percent to increase consumption by 2 percent.  However, if 60 percent of each 
consumer dollar is absorbed by the marketing system, farm prices would then fall by 
around 25 percent (Cochrane, 1958), which is unaffected in the short run by output price 
changes.  Thus, in terms of income, a fall in retail food prices greatly reduces farmers￿ 
cash income. 
Similarly, on the supply side, the short-run supply of agricultural output is highly 
inelastic, implying that the aggregate output of the farm does not change very much in 
relation to changes in the level of prices, even though the composition of production may 
change.  The price inelasticity of supply is due to three principal reasons: (1)  labor and 
land and other capital inputs are considered fixed-cost inputs and are employed fully; (2) 
factors of production are not highly mobile in response to factor price changes; (3) 
producers are entrenched in agriculture as a way of life.   Thus unresponsive supply 
likewise contributes to the wide fluctuations in producer prices.     
Intra- and inter-annual price variability lead to two kinds of economic problems.  
Seasonal fluctuations in producer price levels  lead to a general income problem while 
year-to-year variations around the moving price level lead to the problem of uncertainty.  
When producer price levels either rise or fall in absolute terms, this leads to severe 
negative consequences for either consumers or farmers, respectively.  In the case of price 
uncertainty, where a commodity may rise one year and fall the next, farmers are required   6
to make planning decisions without knowing the following year￿s price, which can lead 
to the inefficient distribution of resources.  On this latter problem, there is considerable 
debate.  In the context of high-income countries where small coalitions of specialized 
producers are highly risk averse and where no commodity is more than 5 to 10 percent of 
consumer budgets, price stabilization is considered welfare reducing (Turnovsky et al., 
1980, Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981).   However, if the crop is key to household earnings or 
is heavily dominant in consumer diets, as is the case in low-income countries where 
budget shares of staples may reach 60 to 70 percent, variable prices have a high impact 
on household welfare.  The poverty of small farmers who are net buyers induces a high 
budget share for staples and price risk aversion, while net sellers unambiguously lose 
from variable prices (Sandmo, 1971; Barrett, 1999). 
 
   
III.  THE AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY TREADMILL 
 
Technological change results in increased total factor productivity, due either to a 
shift in the production function or to improved technical, allocative, scale, or scope 
efficiency with a given production function.   Both sorts of technological change bring 
increased producer profits, but from different sources.   A technological innovation is 
yield-increasing if it increases yields per fixed factor without reducing optimal variable 
costs per fixed factor.  So a yield-increasing technology relies on increased variable 
inputs because it will expand the marginal physical product of inputs and therefore their   7
application rate.
5   A cost-reducing technological innovation, by contrast, reduces optimal 
variable costs per fixed factor but does not increase yields per fixed factor, thus saving 
variable inputs.
6   Yield-increasing innovations reduce average fixed costs while cost-
reducing innovations reduce average variable costs.  In sum, the effect of technology 
adoption on the aggregate supply curve is to shift it outward to the right as producers 
offer more for sale at any price.    
Cochrane￿s (1958) classic theory of the ￿agricultural technology treadmill￿ is an 
apt representation of farmers in a fully commercialized economy.  Hayami and Herdt 
(1977) later applied this theory to the context of semi-subsistence economies where a 
large fraction of the commodity is consumed in the household or local village.  The 
theory is based on the underlying notion of a dynamic process in which over the long run, 
aggregate demand and aggregate supply are engaged in a race.  In this view, the ￿race￿ 
has rarely been equal, and at times it has been very unequal, with extreme income 
consequences.   Whether aggregate demand or aggregate supply wins the race is of great 
consequence to producers.  That is, if population growth outpaces technological advance, 
producer prices will rise.  If technological advance wins over population growth, 
producer prices will fall.  On the global scale and in most countries, the latter scenario 
has prevailed. 
  The idea of the ￿agricultural technology treadmill￿ is simple but powerful.  In an 
economy where all producers are price takers and where a technological advance reduces 
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the per unit costs of production, enterprising or otherwise able producers who adopt a 
new technology early on realize increased net returns because the new technique reduces 
their costs while aggregate supply is not increased sufficiently to lower prices.  As the 
first adopters reap income gains, other producers adopt until widespread adoption of the 
new technology results in an outward shift in the aggregate supply of that commodity and 
a decline in its price.    Because demand is highly inelastic, gross returns to producers 
will fall as aggregate supply shifts out.  Over this dynamic process, the windfall gains of 
the early adopters vanish, later adopters must undertake technological progress just to 
keep from falling behind, and non-adopters suffer unsustainable losses as their unit costs 
do not fall while the price they receive for their product does.   
  When demand is perfectly or highly inelastic, the social gains from technological 
advance accrue to consumers in the form of lower prices.  The agricultural technology 
treadmill thereby reveals an important fallacy of composition: what is welfare-enhancing 
and optimal for the single producer is welfare-detracting and non-optimal in the 
aggregate for producers.  The dynamics of adoption are therefore central to the 
distributional effects of technology adoption.  Early adopters benefit, at least temporarily, 
while late adopters and non-adopters never benefit.  This is closely related to 
Schumpeter￿s notion of "creative destruction," wherein innovators enjoy temporary 
profits from change that also destroys the old order by driving less innovative producers 
out of business. 
   9
SUSTAINABILITY OF TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE 
 
Aggregate supply cannot outrace aggregate demand forever.  At some point, the 
pace must slow down to equal the rate of demand expansion.  Aggregate supply and 
demand are essentially related through the asset base of producers.  Because new 
technologies are capital-using, requiring additional cash outlays, producers who have the 
capacity are willing to invest in order to reduce their unit costs.  However, with falling 
prices and declining incomes, technological advance ￿sows the seeds of its own slow-
down.￿
7  
Even if governments intervened to maintain prices and incomes, a related issue is 
that, because the benefits from agricultural technology development accrue in part (often, 
largely) to consumers, the socially optimal arrangement would be to have some of the 
costs of technology development paid by consumers.  When research and development is 
private and intellectual property rights protect the rights to profit from an innovation, 
firms can capture this cost through royalties and revenues from consumers.  Because 
research has a public good nature and intellectual property rights are weak, financing 
research fro technology development can be a challenge for low-income countries with a 
thin domestic tax base and declining levels of international aid.   
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TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE WITH SEMI-SUBSISTENCE AGRICULTURE 
 
  The above discussion implies that technological progress benefits mainly urban 
consumers at the expense of producers.  However, the situation is significantly different 
when producers themselves consume a significant portion of the commodity (Hayami and 
Ruttan, 1985).  In this case, in a closed economy,  a large proportion of the consumer 
surplus accrues to producers and partially or fully compensates for the loss in producer 
surplus from the treadmill effect.  In Figure 1, Dh represents demand for home 
consumption by producers, DM is the market demand, S0 and S1 are supply curves before 
and after technological change.  With the shift in supply, consumers benefit from 
increased consumption and lower price from P0 to P1.  Consumer surplus increases by the 
area defined by AP0P1B, of which ACGB accrues to non-producers and CP0P1G accrues 
to producers.  Producer surplus changes from AP0O to BP1O.  Although producer surplus 
can, in theory, increase, the more inelastic market demand is, the more producer surplus 
decreases.  However, the larger the quantity of home consumption, the higher the 
consumer surplus is that accrues to producers.  This model can also be extended to the 
case where producers are net buyers of the goods that they produce, in which case they 
benefit from increased consumer surplus. 
  In an open economy, in the case of export crops for which home consumption is 
small and domestic demand is horizontal, the benefits of technical progress accrue 
entirely to producers.  However, at the aggregate global level, the same technology   11
treadmill comes into effect, eventually leading to consumers in importing countries 
gaining most of the benefits of lower international prices. 
 










































Source:  Hayami and Herdt, 1977.   12
IV.  PRICE POLICY OPTIONS 
 
 
In the long run, aggregate supply increases are unsustainable with the effects of 
the agricultural treadmill.  How can policy address the problem of the adverse price 
effects of technological change?  In the context of a small open economy with the 
conditions that characterize much of the developing world, an active debate over the past 
four decades has been centered on three perspectives: the free market school, the 
structuralist school, and the stabilization school (Timmer, 1989).  The free market 
approach, which seems to have won favor by donors and international agencies from the 
1980s onward, argues that agricultural prices should reflect their opportunity costs at the 
border, regardless of the international processes that determine the prices and of the price 
levels (e.g., domestic farm support or export subsidy programs that stimulate excess 
supply in wealthy countries).  This school, promoted by T.W. Schultz and others at the 
University of Chicago, argues this pricing strategy, which relies on the border price, 
results in the optimal efficiency of resource allocation and minimal rent-seeking activity 
(Schultz, 1978; Timmer, 1986; Little and Mirrlees, 1969).  Distinguishing between price 
instability and the treadmill effect is important.  The challenge is for price policy to 
address both.  The border price paradigm addresses the treadmill effect but may 
exacerbate the instability problem.  The converse is true of the structuralist approach.  
The stabilization approach appears to address both the treadmill and the instability 
problem. 
   13
THE BORDER PRICE PARADIGM 
 
  In forwarding the border price as the ￿right￿ price for an agricultural commodity, 
this paradigm supposes a world of full information, competitive markets, and devoid of 
political considerations for income distribution.   The reality is more considerably more 
complex in that (1) the underlying assumptions do not hold in even the best of 
circumstances; (2) political concerns for income distribution cannot be ignored; and (3) 
implementing price policy is a complex task, involving knowledge of international 
commodity trends, shadow price estimation, and foreign exchange rate considerations.  
An important caveat to the border price paradigm is that price interventions through 
border policies can only be implemented if food is a tradable, that is, if trade can take 
place.  The parity price band at port is the band between the F.O.B. and the C.I.F. prices.  
As one moves inland from port, the band expands with domestic marketing costs. If 
domestic prices are set within a wide parity price band, this implies that the transaction 
costs from the farmgate to the border are very high, in which case the commodity is 
likely to be non-tradable.  A commodity is considered non-tradable when either imports 
or exports would require a subsidy.  The width of the export-import parity price band can 
be influenced by changes in internal market conditions or by world price changes.  Thus, 
commodities can switch from non-tradable to tradable through shifts in either demand or 
supply (Figure 2) or in the parity band itself, as by exchange rate devaluation (Barrett 
1999b). 14 













THE STRUCTURALIST APPROACH 
 
  The structuralist school, which has been especially influential in Latin America, 
argues that the border price paradigm is misdirected for basic food products that have 
important roles for the macro economy and for consumer welfare.  Advocates of this 
approach argue that, given the very small price elasticities of demand and of supply, 
allocative losses from misalignment of domestic and border prices are small and that the 
border prices are themselves influenced by distortionary agricultural policies pursued by 
countries with global market power.  This school advocates setting prices according to 
income distribution objectives and macroeconomic stability (Taylor, 1980; Streeten, 
1987; Lipton, 1977).   




















THE STABILIZATION SCHOOL 
 
  The stabilization approach, embraced by many countries in East and Southeast 
Asia, openly rejects the free market approach for primary staples and favors government 
intervention to support and stabilize agricultural prices.   At the same time, this school 
also rejects the structuralist approach of wide deviations from the border price, which can 
entail substantial fiscal costs.  The stabilization approach is based on the premise that, 
while following short-run international price movements leads to significant efficiency 
losses, not following long-term trends has equally significant losses.  Thus, optimal 
efficiency is based on market intervention to stabilize short-run prices but allowing 
flexibility to allow domestic prices to follow long term international price trends 
(Timmer, 1986; Ellis, 1988).  At the same time, this approach favors the development of 
competitive private marketing over time, so that the role of public intervention  declines 
as price stability becomes less important over the course of economic development. 
 
PRICE STABILIZATION IN ASIA  
Indonesian experience with BULOG 
Indonesia￿s policy of stabilizing rice prices throughout the 1970s and early 1980s 
is a classic and well-documented example of the stabilization approach (Ellis, 1993; 
Falcon and Timmer, 1991; Pearson, 1991).  Through a parastatal agency called the Badan 
Urusan Logistik (BULOG), Indonesia operated a buffer-stock scheme that procured rice   16
locally in order to defend a floor producer price, and sold rice in the open market in order 
to defend a ceiling retail price.  BULOG also had a monopoly on rice imports and 
imported rice to fill the gap between domestic supply and demand.  In the mid- to late 
1980s, BULOG exported rice, as domestic supply, spurred by investments in irrigation, 
spread of green revolution technology and appropriate price incentives, exceeded demand 
at the target prices for producers and consumers.   
Over these decades, BULOG was remarkably successful in fostering intra-year 
and inter-year rice price stability.   Four key elements of BULOG￿s success in stabilizing 
prices were (1) intervening in terms of purchases only at the margin of fluctuations in 
peak season volumes; (2) close monitoring of price trends and harvest predictions in 
areas where problems are likely; (3) relatively quick responses to changing local 
conditions; and (4) reliability and credibility of its purchase operations in defending a 
floor price (Ellis, 1993).   
Yet, BULOG￿ operations on average were small relative to the size of the rice 
market: BULOG procured on average 6% of the domestic rice harvest, equivalent to 1.8 
million tons in 1990.  An abundance of competitively operating small private traders in 
the private sector was responsible for the remaining 94% of the rice market.   Skillful 
setting of floor and ceiling prices that maintained incentives for private sector trade and 
storage were a major factor in enabling the private sector trade to develop.  In addition, 
market capacity in Indonesia has been enhanced by years of public investment in market 
infrastructure, both in terms of transport as well as information and communications 
(Timmer, 1997).     17
In recent years, however, BULOG has faced severe financial crises, in part due to 
macro-economic instability involving massive depreciation of the Indonesia rupiah.    
While its level of operations is low compared to total output, BULOG owns and operates 
roughly 3.5 million tons of rice warehouse capacity.  With high overhead costs, BULOG 
has not operated as a profitable enterprise, unable to cover its high per unit costs with 
trading margins from international rice trade and its peak season purchases and later 
sales.     
  
Bangladesh￿s experience with trade for stabilization 
 
  Following broad trade liberalization in the 1990s in Bangladesh and neighboring 
India, Bangladesh has successfully used private sector trade to help stabilize rice and 
wheat prices following major production shortfalls, reducing the need for large 
government stocks (Dorosh, 2001; Goletti, 1994).  In both Bangladesh and India, food 
grain is typically procured at fixed prices through direct purchases of grain from farmers 
or traders.  Until the early 1990s, subsidized sales of grain through ration programs were 
the major distribution channels in Bangladesh.  As part of reforms undertaken in the early 
1990s, however, major ration channels were shut down, with public sector distribution 
almost exclusively targeting poor households, and private imports of wheat and rice were 
also liberalized.   
As a result of the liberalization of Bangladesh￿s imports, as well as of India￿s 
export trade in 1994, India replaced Thailand as the main source of Bangladesh rice 
imports due to lower transport costs and quicker delivery to Bangladesh.  Following   18
several large domestic shortfalls of rice, domestic rice prices in Bangladesh rose to 
import parity levels, providing incentives for private sector imports.  Thus, private 
imports surged in years of large domestic shortfalls and fell to zero in normal production 
years when domestic prices fell below import parity (Figure 3).   Private sector imports 
were especially important for national food security following the floods of 1998, which 
destroyed more than 20 percent of the monsoon season rice crop (about 10 percent annual 
production).  Following the flood, the government of Bangladesh adopted the cautious 
strategy of moderate government imports to supply government distribution channels 
while actively encouraging private sector imports through a policy of zero tariffs and 
other measures.  By following this trade-oriented stabilization strategy, Bangladesh was 
able to increase domestic supplies quickly and successfully stabilize prices (Dorosh, 
2001).   
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Source:  Dorosh, 2001   19
 
FOOD AID AND PRICE EFFECTS 
 
  Food aid has been an important component of food policy in many low-income, 
food-deficit countries for the past five decades.  The impact of food aid on domestic 
prices depends fundamentally on how extensive the need for food is within a recipient 
country, how effectively food aid reaches those in need, and the substitutability between 
major domestic food staples and the commodities imported as food aid.  Food aid that 
reaches needy populations having an income elasticity of demand for food near one 
stimulates local food demand at nearly the same rate it increases local food supply.  But 
as fewer people need less food to satisfy nutritional requirements, food aid begins to have 
adverse incentive effects of producers and traders in recipient country markets by 
expanding supply faster than demand.   
In the case of the impact of food aid on the domestic market for the same 
commodity, such as the impact of wheat food aid on the domestic wheat market, the 
distributed food aid adds to the total supply of wheat in the economy, shifting the supply 
curve from S to S￿ (Figure 4).   At the same time, the transfer of food aid in kind to a 
household (or a cash transfer funded by the monetization of food aid) adds to household 
resources, tending to increase demand for the food aid commodity (unless it is an inferior 
good).  In general, the increase in demand is less than the size of the food aid transfer,
8 so 
even well-targeted food aid distributions tend to shift the demand curve to the right from 
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are about 0.3 (del Ninno and Dorosh, 2002).     20
D to D￿ by less than the amount of the food aid, resulting in a fall in prices (Dorosh and 
Haggblade, 1997).
9  The more poorly food aid is targeted, the more severe the adverse 
price effects of food aid distribution (Barrett and Clay 2002, Barrett, Holden and Clay, 
forthcoming).    
 













In the case of the impact of food aid on the domestic market for a substitute 
commodity, such as the impact of wheat food aid on the domestic maize market, there are 
                                                 
9 Note that these results are for a closed economy or a situation where the food aid commodity is not traded 
internationally by the private sector because the import parity price is higher and the export parity price is 
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no direct supply effects, just demand-side effects.  The cross-price effects of food aid are 
more ambiguous than the own-price effects. Food aid transfers (or cash transfers financed 
by the monetization of food aid), tend to decrease the demand for substitute commodities, 
such as for rice in the case of wheat food aid.  The transfer also, however, has the earlier-
discussed income effects, which tend to increase the demand for both substitute and 
complementary foods.  The net cross-price effect of food aid therefore depends on the 
relative magnitudes of the (generally negative) substitution and (generally positive) 
income effects. That is, domestic maize production rises due to technical change results 
in a fall in maize prices from P0 to P1 as the supply curve shifts from S to S￿ (Figure 6).  
With wheat food aid, this fall in maize prices is exacerbated by reduced demand for 
maize (shifting the demand curve from D to D￿), resulting in a lowering of the maize 
price even further to P2 (Figure 5).    
 In sum, food aid usually exerts downward pressure on food prices, with that 
pressure greatest in places where targeting is poor. The South Asian experience in 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India nonetheless demonstrates that, with appropriate 
government policies, rapid technological change in agriculture can enable countries to 
expand food production even in the face of substantial inflows of food aid and their 
attendant adverse producer price incentive effects.  These policies are investments in 
rural infrastructure, assuring input supply to farmers, and maintaining remunerative 
producer prices (Shaw and Clay, 1993).   In Bangladesh, which reached record levels of 
grain production in 1999/2000 and 2000/2001, green revolution technology in the form of 
small-scale irrigation, expansion of improved seed and fertilizer use has contributed to   22
the doubling of rice output and increases of wheat production multiple-fold over the past 
two decades.  In this period, the uses of food aid have evolved from the use of monetized 
food aid funds for public expenditures in the 1970s and early 1980s to reforms in the late 
1980s and 1990s to improve targeting and reduce leakages (Dorosh et al., 2002).    
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V.  AGRICULTURAL GROWTH AND PRICE POLICY IN ASIA 
 
  From a relatively desperate situation in the early 1960s, Asian economies have 
undergone a dramatic transformation over the past 30 years.   Famine was averted in 
South Asia as foodgrain production rose 92 percent while using only 4 percent more land 
from the 1970s to the 1990s.  In East and Southeast Asia, cereal production nearly 
doubled in the same period, while using 22 percent more land.  Real per capita income 
increased multiple-fold in China and Indonesia and doubled elsewhere and the incidence 
of poverty in Asia fell from 60 percent to 20 percent in the period from 1975 to 1995 
(Rosegrant and Hazell, 2000).    
How did countries in Asia achieve this tremendous agricultural transformation 
without succumbing to the adverse price effects described in earlier sections?  What price 
policy options did they exercise?  A closer investigation of the growth experiences in 
China, Taiwan, South Korea, and India reveals that, while there is no single blueprint, a 
clearly emerging commonality is the importance of providing remunerative prices to 
producers, of investing in rural infrastructure, and of developing the rural non-farm 
economy to increase rural incomes.  
 
THE CHINESE RURAL DEVELOPMENT MIRACLE IN A MIXED ECONOMY: 
1979-97 
 
Starting in 1979, the People￿s Republic of China instituted major reforms of its 
agricultural sector that created a mixed economy in which central planning and markets 
co-exist.  These market-oriented reforms contributed to the extraordinary growth of GDP   24
of nearly 10 percent annually over the period from 1979 to 1984 (USDA-ERS, 2002).  
The reforms consisted of dismantling the commune system, granting farmers decision-
making power, introducing the contract responsibility system, and raising producer prices 
(Du, 1987).  Prior to and during the initial stage of reforms, the state set mandatory 
minimum delivery quotas for grain at fixed prices that remained well below international 
parity prices as well as a price bonus for above quota deliveries (Sicular, 1988).  In the 
first stage of reforms, between 1977 and 1982, the state maintained this planned 
apparatus, but reduced quota levels by 20 percent and increased quota prices by 20 
percent.  It also increased the percentage price bonus of above quota deliveries from 30 
percent to 50 percent.  In this reform period, the state also encouraged private local and 
long-distance exchange, although producers could only sell to the private sector after 
fulfilling quota deliveries.   
In response to this liberalization policy, the number of markets more than doubled 
from 30,000 to 61,000 between 1977 and 1985, with more than 18 percent of purchases 
in 1984 at market prices (Sicular, 1988).    At the same time, the state established a 
system of negotiated purchase prices for deliveries above the quota, with prices jointly 
agreed between producers and local state commercial agents.   One problem that arose 
was the increased quota evasion by farmers who found means to sell at higher market 
prices (Table 1).  Second, as surpluses emerged and market prices fell, government stocks 
at above quota prices were built up because the state had no maximum delivery limit.  
Third, as the growth in income lead to increased selectivity of demand, the state found   25
itself holding stocks of undesirable commodities while consumer demand for higher 
quality goods was not met (Sicular, 1988).   
These problems lead to the second stage of reforms.  Starting in 1983, the 
government removed the price distinction between quota and above-quota prices for 
oilseeds, grains, and cotton and established a new system of pricing based on a weighted 
average of the old quota and non-quota prices.  It also replaced the quota system with a 
system of negotiated purchase contracts with farmers before the sowing season, which 
gave farmers the choice of contracting or selling at market prices at harvest.    
 
Table 1￿Growth of Commercial Activities in China, 1977-1985 
 





33302 38993 40809 43013 44775 48003 56500  61337 
Urban  0  0 2226 2919 3298 3591 4488 6144  8013 
Rural 2988
2 
33302 36767 37890 39715 41184 43515 50356  53324 
Volume of trade 
(billion yuan) 
10.5 12.5 18.3 23.5 28.7 33.3 38.6 47.1  70.5 
Percent of total 
purchases at 
market prices 
n.a.   5.6  n.a  n.a.  9.4  10.2  10.5  18.1  n.a. 
Source:  Ministry of Commerce, 1984 in Sicular, 1988. 
 
In attempting to boost incomes and production incentives, the government further 
reduced the amount procured under the contract system after 1985, from 74 million tons 
in 1985 to 52 million tons after 1988.  It also increased the procurement price further in 
1987-89 and in 1992-95 to cope with inflation.  As procurement prices rose and 
production continued to expand, the gap between procurement and market prices 
narrowed.  In 1997, the price relation reversed to a situation in which market prices fell   26
below procurement prices, following two consecutive bumper harvests, and the state 
began to incur heavy losses associated with what became a price support program after 
1997 (USDA-ERS, 2002).   Thus, in 1998, China entered a third stage of grain market 
reforms, in which market forces would determine quota procurement prices and the 
government would no longer procure low-quality grains.    In sum, technological change 
increased output per worker, rural incomes were raised through changing the marketing 
system and employment structure and encouraging the outflow of workers from 
agriculture into the rural non-farm economy.  In turn, the demand linkages of increased 
rural incomes supported urban industrial development. 
 
THE TAIWANESE TRANSFORMATION: 1952-1987 
 
The earlier experience of structural transformation in Taiwan is perhaps one of the 
most dramatic and illustrative examples of rapid rural development (Mellor, 1986).  In 
the period from 1952 to 1980, Taiwan made very impressive gains in transforming its 
economy from a primarily agrarian-based to a diversified economy.  The relative share of 
agriculture in domestic output declined from 38% in 1953 to 6% in 1987.  The real net 
domestic product of agriculture increased by about 80% during the 1952-64 period, at an 
average annual rate of 5%, even as the share of agriculture in net domestic product 
declined from 36% to 28% (Kuo et al, 1981).   Because the rural labor force only 
increased by one-third over the whole period, the 5% annual growth in agricultural output 
assured a net agricultural surplus and enabled structural transformation to proceed rapidly 
(Table 2).   27
In this period, Taiwan￿s agricultural price policy, for rice in particular, focused on 
maintaining stable prices.   To do so, the government procured and stocked large 
quantities of rice, up to 1973 (Mao and Schive, 1995).   It collected rice through paddy 
land taxes in kind, compulsory purchases from landowners, rent in kind from 
government-owned land, the barter of fertilizer for rice, and the repayment in kind of 
production loans.  All of these methods resulted in the procurement of 50 to 60 percent of 
the total volume of rice marketed in the period up to 1973.  This policy resulted in an 
extended period of stable rice prices, while maintaining a narrow spread between 
producer and consumer prices.  The government taxed farmers in this period both through 
the hidden tax in the compulsory purchase system as well as the farmland tax.   In the 
case of compulsory purchases, the government taxed farmers by offering prices that were 
70-80 percent of the market price.  Similarly, the fertilizer barter terms and the 
production loans were at unfavorable terms to producers.   
By 1973, the government had reduced its procurement to only 20 percent of the 
market volume and significantly reduced the hidden tax on compulsory purchases (Mao 
and Schive, 1995).  In 1973, the government switched to a guaranteed rice price policy, 
with the objective of raising farm incomes.   28 
 
Table 2￿Changes in the Economic Structure of Taiwan, 1953-1987 
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Source: Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1988 in Mao, 1992 
 
GOVERNMENT-LED AGRICULTURAL MODERNIZATION IN KOREA: 1961-1986 
 
Until the mid-1960s, South Korea was one of the largest recipients of U.S. food 
aid and, despite the poverty of its agricultural sector, followed an agricultural policy of 
three lows: low grain prices, low interest rates, and low exchange rate (Diao et al., 2002).  
Over the 1961 to 1986 period, the agricultural sector grew at an average rate of 3.3 
percent per year while real GNP grew by 8.4 percent, thus reducing the share of 
agriculture in GNP from 40 percent to 13 percent.  In this period, the agricultural labor 
force decreased by 6 million and the number of farm households declined by 18 percent 
while average farm income rose from US $ 466 in 1961 to US $6,813 in 1986 (Kim, 
1987).  In this period of modernization, Korean agriculture became more diversified, 
shifting from cereals to fruits and vegetable and livestock.   Korea￿s integrated strategy   29
for the Green Revolution involved establishing a nationwide campaign to disseminate 
high yield varieties among rice farmers in 1972, dramatically increasing the acreage of 
the new variety (IR-667 or Tongil) from 2,750 hectares in 1971 to 929,000 hectares in 
1978.   
  Korea￿s agricultural price policy in the earlier period from the 1950s consisted of 
maintaining low prices to avoid inflation.  However, this policy discouraged agricultural 
production and, in view of this, the government raised its purchase price by 17% in 1968, 
and continued to raise the real producer price of grains.  Thus, as of 1969, Korea began to 
subsidize rather than tax agriculture and initiated a policy of direct transfers to farm 
households in 1975.  To date, Korea has continued to provide among the highest levels of 
support to its agriculture in the world (USDA-ERS, 2002).   In addition, in 1966, the 
government established a price stabilization fund to smooth price fluctuations, 
particularly for cash crops.  A centerpiece of Korea￿s successful strategy to achieve self-
sufficiency in rice and barley was the complete protection of these markets through 
import bans as well direct subsidies.    Thus, consumer prices for rice and other 
agricultural goods have remained considerably higher than international prices, which 
have driven urban wages higher.   
 
FROM FAMINE TO FOOD SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN INDIA: 1967-1986 
 
  Indian agricultural production nearly doubled in a period of two decades, 
achieved through impressive gains in yields per hectare.  In the period from 1967 to 
1986, agricultural output grew annually by 2.7 percent, outpacing the population growth   30
rate of 2.24 percent.  During this period, land area increased by only 0.4 percent per year, 
while yields per hectare increased by 2.0 percent, leading to significant productivity 
gains. The strategy of grain production was centered on modern, high-yielding, varieties 
of wheat and rice, released on a large scale in 1967.  By 1981/82, nearly 75 percent of 
area planted of wheat and 50 percent of rice planted was using modern varieties. In order 
to achieve and maintain the momentum of the significant yield gains brought about in this 
period, the government managed the difficult task of delivering modern inputs to millions 
of small farmers, establishing massive extension services, and strengthening credit and 
marketing institutions (Vyas, 1987).    Three factors were critical in maintaining the 
momentum of the Green Revolution: (1) expansion of area under irrigation; (2) 
continuous adaptation and release of new varieties; and (3) provision of fertilizers and 
other inputs.   
  Price policy played a major role in spreading the Green Revolution through 
ensuring stable and remunerative prices for crops with the potential for yield gains 
through technological advances.  The Food Corporation of India (FCI), established in 
1964, operated a public food distribution system.  An autonomous entity called the 
Agricultural Price Commission was established in 1965 to establish minimum support 
prices and procurement prices in order to support the spread of new technology.   Thus, in 
Punjab, the procurement price of wheat from 1967 to 1986 ranged from 104 to 152 
percent of the production cost, and, in the case of paddy rice, from 107 to 124 percent 
(Bhalla, 1995).    31
Price policy was closely coordinated with India￿s technology policy.  
Remunerative prices for crops for which new technologies were available were 
announced prior to the sowing season in order to encourage adoption of technology 
without fear of falling prices.  From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, wheat production 
more than doubled as minimum support prices were increased at 3 percent per year to 
offset rising input costs.   Similarly, with the introduction of a superior technology of rice 
in the mid-1970s, minimum support prices for rice were boosted by 7 percent per year, a 
rate much higher than the increase in input prices (Vyas, 1987).    Second, price policies 
were aimed at softening, while not entirely eliminating, market price volatility.  Finally, 
price policies evolved in latter years to ensuring consumer benefits through reducing the 
margin between minimum support prices and farmers costs.   
However, steady increases in producer prices, combined with good weather, have 
resulted in continued production increases and a massive stock build-up.  As stocks have 
increased, the Government of India has taken increasingly aggressive measures to 
promote exports, both through sales of government stocks for exports and promotion of 
private sector exports.   
 
LESSONS FROM ASIAN EXPERIENCES 
The review of experiences with price policy during the critical phases of the 
agricultural transformation in China, Taiwan, Korea, and India reveals that, in spite of the 
country specificities, several common factors emerge.  These are: (i) the active role 
played by government; (ii) the emphasis on price stability as well as price support; (iii)   32
the co-existence of government support with market mechanisms; and (iv) the evolution 
of government intervention over the transformation, which moved from initially taxing 
agriculture to supporting it.  In the next section, we address the relevance of these lessons 
for present-day Africa. 
 




Africa has yet to embark firmly on a massive Green Revolution of the scale and 
extent experienced in Asia.  Indeed, it is projected that Africa will continue to be a net 
food importer on average in the short term.  However, if Africa is to achieve a 
transformation, a critical issue is to what extent Asia￿s experiences matter and to what 
extent the different policy environment Africa finds itself in may hinder or encourage this 
transformation.  The Asian experience points to the extensive role of government in both 
stabilizing and supporting prices as a means of encouraging and sustaining technology 
adoption.  The African reality at present is that markets are expected to do the job.   
If that is so, then the African experience of agricultural transformation will be 
very different than that of Asia. The first question then is: Is it possible to have an 
agricultural transformation that relies so heavily on market forces?  The second question 
is: If so, how does this shape the agricultural transformation experience?  In response to 
the first question, a market-based agricultural transformation will have to be based on 
effectively functioning markets, in which transaction costs are not prohibitively high, 
market access is even across the population, and neutral market intermediaries absorb   33
risk.    The integration of markets, intra- and inter-nationally, determines the slope of the 
aggregate demand curve facing local producers.  The more segmented the market, the 
more price inelastic the demand and the lesser a share of the gains accrue to the producers 
(Barrett, 1997).  If the marketing system is competitive, then aggregate supply changes 
are met with changes in aggregate demand, as predicted by theory.  But if there is market 
power or market failure of any sort, in inter-seasonal storage, transport, wholesaling, 
processing, etc., especially if this is due to minimum efficient scales of investment and 
operation coupled with fixed capacity limits, then market failure can have especially 
negative effects on grain prices.  
In response to the second question, a defining characteristic of a market-based 
agricultural transformation is that farmers will have to be far more commercially oriented 
than their Asian counterparts, thinking pro-actively of market opportunities, premia for 
quality and post-harvest handling, and diversification into high-value products.   
To create both of the above conditions, governments will have to make significant 
investments and be actively engaged, in different roles than the traditional price 
interventionist role.  Thus, to make markets work, governments must invest in 
infrastructure, such as transport and telecommunications; in institutions, such as quality 
control, grades and standards, contract dispute settlement mechanisms, information 
systems, among others; and in social capital, such as business networks, producer 
associations, and industry groups.   To make farmers behave commercially, governments 
must invest in farmer training, new models of market-oriented extension, new types of 
farmer associations and cooperatives, and innovative financial instruments, among others.   34
Scattered throughout the continent, there are pockets of emerging agricultural 
transformation where yield increases have been sustained over time.  In such countries, 
for example in the case of Ethiopia over the 1996-2001 period, maize yields increased 
significantly over the 1996-2000 period, due to the introduction of new maize technology 
and dramatic increases in fertilizer application.    However, in areas not affected by 
drought, the increased production in the 2001-2002 harvest resulted in a 60 percent 
decline in producer prices in 2002, leading to a drop in fertilizer and seed use by nearly 
30 percent in 2003.  This situation was brought about by a very weak marketing system, 
characterized by high transaction costs, that was unable to absorb the surplus and 
distribute it to export or store it over time.   The Ethiopian marketing system is not unlike 
many others in Africa. 
Given the weak state of market systems in Africa, clearly a market-based 
agricultural production transformation will not happen without a significant 
transformation of the marketing system itself.  But this takes time and may not happen 
fast enough for pressing objectives of hunger and poverty alleviation, even if done in 
parallel.  The alternative to the laissez-faire approach is to consider what a rational price 
policy should be that relies on the market while not leaving it all to the market. 
  What is the appropriate pricing policy vis-￿-vis price stabilization in the face of 
inherently inelastic demand for agricultural goods?    Recent experience in countries such 
as Indonesia and India illustrate the use of export markets as a means of absorbing excess 
domestic supply, thus providing a market-based means of domestic price stabilization.   
Successful implementation of this policy requires establishment of trading contacts and a   35
thorough understanding of the relevant import and export parity prices.    Second, a 
market-based stabilization approach implies that policy must focus on stimulating 
domestic demand through income growth, based on employment creation, particularly in 
the non-farm sector (Haggblade and Hazell, 1989).  General economic growth helps drive 
demand, which keeps food prices up in the face of expanding supply from technological 
change.  This is a crucial part of East Asia￿s structural transformation (Gabre-Madhin and 
Johnston, 2002).   
  The alternative to the free market-based transformation strategy is that of a 
market-based stabilization policy to support agricultural transformation.  By placing the 
burden of ensuring stability on governments and not markets, it transfers risk away from 
producers, who are least able to bear it.  This has the effect of sustaining the momentum 
of an agricultural transformation, which depends on the continued adoption of technology 
by farmers.  To carry out this strategy, governments must be nimble, must be committed 
to improving markets, must be able to take risks, and must encourage and collaborate 
with the private sector, on whom this strategy crucially depends.  This is the challenge 
facing Africa in the market-based agricultural transformation it seeks to achieve. 
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